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Abstract—Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) are often imple-
mented using virtual machines (VMs) because they provide an
isolated environment compatible with classical cloud computing
technologies. Unfortunately, VMs are demanding in terms of
required resources and therefore are not suitable for resource-
constrained devices such as residential CPEs. However, such
hardware often runs a Linux-based operating system that sup-
ports several software modules (e.g., iptables) that can be used
to implement network functions (e.g., a firewall), which can be
exploited to provide some of the services offered by simple VNFs,
but with reduced overhead. In this paper we propose and validate
an architecture that integrates those native software components
in a Network Function Virtualization (NFV) platform, making
their use transparent from the user’s point of view.
Keywords-Customer Premise Equipment; Network Function
Virtualization; Virtual Network Function; Home Networks;
Home Gateway; Home Security;
I. INTRODUCTION
While cloud providers can count on centralized data centers
encompassing mainly homogeneous servers, telecom operators
feature an existing widely distributed infrastructure made of
heterogeneous devices. In particular, although we can see
clear benefits by integrating current Customer Premise Equip-
ment (CPE) in the Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)
infrastructure [1], those devices are usually based on low-cost
hardware that cannot support Virtualized Network Functions
(VNFs) under the form of virtual machines.
However, we can note that most CPEs are based on the
Linux operating system, which includes (hence it can po-
tentially execute) a broad set of existing software network
functions (e.g., firewall, NAT, virtual switch, etc) running on
the bare hardware.
This paper exploits this capability and proposes a software
architecture that integrates existing CPEs in an NFV domain,
leaving complex VNFs in the data center while simple Native
Network Functions (NNFs) are executed in the CPE with low
hardware resources, especially on the Home Gateway, hence
combining the benefits of the cloud with the locality of the
services running on local CPEs.
NNFs rely on the native capabilities, i.e. software compo-
nents that are already available on the CPE and that can be
executed directly on the host operating system. In particular,
the concept of “native” involves not only regular and built-
in network functions (such as a virtual switching instance),
but also elements (e.g., the Linux iptables module) that can
be exploited to build network services (e.g., a firewall). As
a result, native functions lead to significant improvements, in
terms of memory consumption, storage requirements and start-
up time, compared to existing technologies (LXC, Docker,
VMs), enabling the execution of network functions even on
resource-constrained devices.
Our solution enables an NFV orchestrator to optimize the
scheduling of the Network Functions (NFs) by starting the
services that require network functions close to the end user
(e.g., IPsec terminator, low-latency services) directly on the
user CPE, while other components of the same service (e.g.,
the NAT module) are executed in a remote data center. This
requires our architecture to define an abstraction that allows
the orchestrator to understand the capabilities of the underlying
infrastructure domain, and that can handle the lifecycle of
each network function independently from its actual imple-
mentation. Furthermore, a reasonable security model has to
be defined in order to support multi-tenancy for NNF as
well, as the nice properties in terms of security and isolation
guaranteed by traditional hypervisors are not available in our
context.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section examines similar works in current research. Section III
describes the technologies used in this work. Section IV
presents and describes Native Network Functions with their
abstraction. Experimental results that validate this work are
shown in Section V, followed by some final considerations
and conclusions in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The necessity to introduce more flexibility in CPEs serving
home/small office customers has increased over the years and
has become evident with the emerging NFV paradigm. In fact,
a recent trend consists in moving (part of) the CPE functions
in the data center with the so called virtual CPE (vCPE) such
as in [2], [3]; a minimal hardware appliance is left at the
edge of the network, while (most of) the intelligence is moved
to the cloud and implemented through virtual functions. An
intermediate step toward a fully virtualized CPE is proposed
in [4], which is based on the architecture defined by the
Home Gateway Initiative industry alliance1. This architecture
1http://www.homegatewayinitiative.org/. However, this working group will
be shut down in 2016.
is highly modular and implements the different CPE functions
as Java OSGi bundles, which can be dynamically loaded/dis-
carded on demand. The Surrogate vNF proposed by the paper
extends this paradigm by defining a set of “proxy” OSGi
functions that keep compatibility with the existing architecture
while delegate most of the processing to a companion VNF
running in the cloud.
However, the above solutions require excellent connectivity
between the customer premises and the data center, and may
introduce excessive delay for some latency-sensitive services.
Furthermore, although in principle NFV enables a telecom
operator to orchestrate its services by exploiting the resources
offered across its entire network infrastructure, the vCPE
approach cannot exploit resources that may be available on
the CPE itself as VNFs are moved to the cloud.
Edge-based services are proposed in [5], which exploits
eBPF programs to create a programmable data path in the CPE
while the control plane is kept on the cloud. The CPE is able
to handle locally the traffic, hence guaranteeing its operations
also in case the connectivity toward the cloud is lost. Although
this solution is very efficient, the eBPF virtual machine is
not Turing-complete and cannot support even simple programs
(e.g., string matching) that are rather common at the edge of
the network.
Considering that the CPE is usually resource-constrained,
[6] proposes an optimization model that is able to select the
best VNF among a set of possible choices, hence optimizing
the cost of the VNFs deployed on CPE. However, they rely on
the existing technologies for the VNF implementation such as
Linux containers or virtual machines, thus being orthogonal
with the idea proposed in this paper.
To summarize, current NFV-compatible solutions do not
support local processing in the CPEs, while more flexible CPE
architectures are still limited in terms of supported features
and are not compliant with the NFV world. This paper aims
at achieving both objectives, namely NFV compatibility and
arbitrary traffic processing in the CPE, while still supporting
possible VNF running in the cloud, if needed.
III. BACKGROUND
The architecture proposed in this paper, depicted in Figure 2,
is an extension of the Universal Node (UN) [7] developed in
the EU UNIFY project [1].
The UN is a single box, e.g., a server, that features a
control plane that is able to jointly orchestrate network and
compute resources, supports multiple execution environments
and different virtual switches, and advertises functional capa-
bilities (e.g., capability to execute a NAT service) instead of
infrastructure-like information (e.g., KVM execution environ-
ment, available memory, etc.). The UN is a tiny infrastructure
domain and it exploits locally available information to opti-
mize the service evaluating local resources/constraints, such
as assigning VNFs to the best CPU cores.
Upon accepting a new service request from an overarching
orchestrator that is in charge of the global deployment of
the service across multiple infrastructure domains, the UN
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Figure 2. Architecture of the Universal Node.
can either deploy exactly the VNFs requested by the global
orchestrator or, in case “generic” VNFs are chosen (e.g., a
generic firewall instead of the one of a specific manufacturer) it
relies on an additional component, the VNF resolver, to select
the best implementation available. Furthermore, it creates a
new Logical Switching Instance (LSI) to properly steer the
traffic among the selected VNFs.
A. Network abstraction
The network controller of the UN manages the networking
paths among the deployed VNFs through multiple levels of
LSIs: a base LSI-0 and a set of LSI-N (where N ≥ 1), each
one in charge of a different deployed graph (Figure 1). The
first (LSI-0) dispatches the traffic from the physical interfaces
of the machine to the LSIs of the other graphs. The additional
LSIs create the traffic steering paths between the VNFs that
belong to that graph. Each LSI is managed by a separate
embedded OpenFlow controller, provided by the UN, that
dynamically inserts the proper rules in its flow table(s).
A switch manager module can control different types of
virtual switches by means of the set of primitives listed in
Table I
NETWORK ABSTRACTION IN THE UN
Function Description
createLSI() Create an LSI
deleteLSI() Remove an LSI
createPort() Create a port connected to a NF on an LSI
deletePort() Remove a port connected to a NF from an LSI
createTSRule() Generate a new traffic steering rule in an LSI
deleteTSRule() Remove an existing traffic steering rule from an LSI
Table II
COMPUTE ABSTRACTION IN THE UN
Function Description
createNF() Allocate the resources to start the NF; create a shadow
(local) copy of the NF image (if needed)
startNF() Attach ports to the NF, and starts the NF image
stopNF() Stop the NF, without deallocating resources
updateNF() Update the NF while running, e.g., by removing or
hotplugging new network interfaces
deleteNF() Release the resources (memory, shadow disk image)
allocated to the NF
pauseNF() Suspend the NF execution (for possible migration)
Table I and implemented by each technology-specific driver.
Basically, the abstraction allows to (i) create/delete an LSI,
(ii) create/remove a port on the LSI that is connected to a
NF, and (iii) create/remove a traffic steering rule between
VNFs or ports. This allow to replace a generic virtual switch
implementation with an hardware-accelerated one, without
impacting on the rest of the software.
B. Compute abstraction
The compute controller is responsible for the VNF lifecycle
management, such as instantiate, terminate and update a VNF.
This is achieved by defining a common compute abstraction
(Table II) that is generic enough to be applicable to any type
of execution environment. This abstraction is implemented by
a set of drivers, each one in charge of a specific execution
environment technology (e.g., VM, Docker, DPDK process)
with the associated required parameters. For instance, the
plugin that manages the KVM hypervisor creates on the fly
the proper XML file required by the libvirt library for the
VM instantiation when the createNF() call is invoked.
Each compute driver needs also to support different types
of interfaces (e.g., dpdkr, virtio, etc.), according to the
specific execution environment, as each execution environment
supports only a subset of the available port types. In this re-
spect, the compute controller needs to be coordinated with the
network controller in order to attach the VNF ports, according
to the required technology, to the existing softswitch.
C. Northbound interface
The northbound interface of the UN is bidirectional: the
downstream direction is based on generic service graphs that
have to be instantiated on the node, while the upstream
direction is used to export the information needed by an
overarching orchestrator and that is used to properly instantiate
the requested service across different infrastructure domains.
The UN exports three types of information to such an upper
layer orchestrator. Functional capabilities represent the ability
to execute a specific network function, such as a NAT or
firewall service, optionally with some specific characteristics,
such as the capability to handle high amount of traffic (e.g.,
because it can exploit an hardware accelerator available in
the node). Infrastructure-level capabilities refers lower-level
characteristics, such as the CPU architecture, the ability to
execute generic VMs or Docker containers, etc. Available
resources refer to the about of unused hardware resources,
such as the amount of free memory or the presence of an
hardware accelerator.
The capability to advertise functional capabilities is a unique
feature of the UN and it represents also the main reason we
can bring the concept of Native Network Functions in this
environment. In fact, an overarching orchestrator that operates
based on functional capabilities will not decide the actual VNF
implementation to be used, but it will only tell the underlying
domain (e.g., the UN) to start a specific network function,
leaving to that domain the decision about the specific VNF
flavor (e.g., VM, Docker, etc) to be used. In turn, the UN will
delegate this decision to the the VNF resolver.
IV. NATIVE NETWORK FUNCTIONS
This section introduces the concept of Native Network
Function, i.e. a data-plane processing component that exploits
capabilities natively present on the compute node and cannot
be exploited by current NFV solutions. Our architecture allows
NNFs to work alongside traditional VNFs, giving the possi-
bility to improve overall network performance without losing
the flexibility guaranteed by the NFV approach.
A. NNF model and VNF template
In principle, a generic NNF must be compliant with the
interface defined for all the compute drivers, such as in
Table II. However, each NNF may require some additional
properties that have to be satisfied in order to be able to
run. Therefore, besides all the information required for the
execution of a generic VNF (e.g., number of ports, port
types), additional properties refer to either dependencies or
requirements. Those might refer to software packages (e.g.,
executables, libraries) available on the compute node that are
already installed and that are required for the NNF to operate.
In addition, our model considers also information regarding
the status of the allocated function, telling about current
configuration and resource used by the function. This data
is needed in order to be able to release the resources used by
the NNF when the function stops, while in traditional VMs
resources are freed along with the deletion of the VM.
In order to cope with this data, we extended the network
function template to keep both VNF general attributes, com-
mon for all types of network function, and NNF-specific
{
”name” : ”firewall” ,
”uri” : ”http://repo/native/firewall.tgz”,
”vnf !"#$%&'&%()!*+$%,
”multitenancy” : true,
”dependencies” : 
{ ”capability”: [ {
”name” : ”iptables”,
”type” : ”package” ,
} ] },
}
Figure 3. Excerpt of the template of a firewall NNF.
information. Figure 3 contains an excerpt of an NNF template
representing a native firewall, which shows the properties of
the function. In particular, it exploits iptables as a native capa-
bility and also supports multi-tenancy. The function handlers
that will be used by the compute controller to drive its life-
cycle (e.g., start, modify and stop) are available at the given
URI with a specific format. The template also specifies basic
I/O and network configuration of the function, information
needed for driving the other NF types as well, not shown in
the example.
B. The native compute driver
After receiving the VNF template, the compute controller
has to control the native function by using the abstraction
described in Section III-B. The native driver will download the
function using the URI specified in the VNF template, which
points to a .tgz file. The above archive is a very compact file
that includes a set of bash scripts that are called to perform
the actions listed in Table II, such as starting a new instance
of the NNF, updating, stopping and all the other actions that
are required in the VNF lifecycle management. As evident,
the support for bash is the only requirement for running a
NNF, which, in turn, enables native functions to be seamlessly
deployed on machines with different CPU architectures.
C. I/O model
In the traditional NFV framework, the traffic steering among
the VNFs is carried out by a virtual switch that forwards
packets according to the rules given by a network controller.
Each VNF is provided by a certain number of virtual network
interfaces that correspond to its ports, connected to the virtual
switch.
In order to seamlessly support the execution of NNFs, the
same I/O model must be repeated and therefore each NNF
should be connected to the vSwitch with the appropriate
number of ports. In this way, the network controller remains
exactly the same and can create virtual ports for the NNF as
well as for the VNF.
In the NNF case, these ports are implemented as virtual
Ethernet (veth) interfaces assigned to a network namespace
on which the NNF is executed. As such, each NNF sees its
own network interfaces that can use to retrieve/send its own
specific network traffic.
D. Isolation model
Differently from current virtualization technologies that
natively support an isolation model for the instantiated VNFs,
the NNF driver needs to explicitly implement a layer that
provides at least some form of isolation of the NNF against
the rest of the system.
The NNF driver leverages the Linux namespaces by creating
a new network namespace before running an NNF, adds to it
the virtual network ports required by the function, and then
launches the NNF inside the namespace. As a result, the NNF
is isolated for the incoming traffic that will be only the one
sent by the vswitch to the veth of the NNF. The name of
the namespace is unequivocally related with the graph and the
function name, thus avoiding possible collisions. At the end
of the execution of the NNF, the namespace is deleted by the
native driver and all the other related resources are freed.
Differently from Linux containers that exploit all the dif-
ferent types of namespaces available in the Linux OS, NNFs
use by default only the network one in order to guarantee net-
work isolation between different NNFs. A more sophisticated
isolation model, leveraging multiple namespaces that can be
activated on demand (based on the requirements of the tenant,
the infrastructure owner, and NF), is currently in progress.
E. Multitenancy
In a traditional NFV architecture in which each VNF runs
on a distinct VM, multitenancy is an intrinsic property of the
execution model. In fact, multiple instances of the same VNF
can always be launched while traffic steering primitives can
set the proper flow rules to the software switches in order to
create the correct traffic steering paths among VNFs.
Supposing that a NNF can be instantiated multiple times,
multitenancy is achieved by encapsulating multiple instances
of the NNF in dedicated namespaces whose virtual interfaces
are connected to different ports of the software switches. On
the contrary, if a NNF does not support multiple instances
running at the same time, multitenancy should be managed by
means of an ad-hoc marking mechanism that allows the NNF
to distinguish between traffic belonging to different service
graphs.
F. Security considerations
Launching a native function, hence a script running on the
bare hardware, offers less protection than starting a software
in a VM or in a Docker container, which can leverage the
additional protection shield provided by the hypervisor or the
Docker execution engine. For instance, little protection exists
to limit the resources used by native functions, e.g., in terms
of CPU/memory consumption or the number of occupied CPU
cores. Although the impact of the above problems could be
limited by turning on some addition Linux mechanism such as
cgroup, this complicates the solution to the extent to which
other alternatives may be more appealing, such as replacing
the NNF with a Docker-based implementation.
In any case no protection exists that prevents a VNF, which
is expected to provide a given service (e.g., firewall), to behave
U
n
iv
e
rs
a
l 
N
o
d
e
CPE (device under test)
User device
(traffic source)
Corporate VPN 
server Server 
(traffic sink)
Corporate
LAN
IPSec client
endpoint IPSec server
endpoint
Figure 4. Testbed used in the validation.
Table III
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEVICES USED IN THE VALIDATION
Machine(s) Hardware and software characteristics
User device (source) Intel Core i7-4770, 32GB RAM, 500GB HD
Traffic server (sink) Linux Ubuntu 14.04, Kernel version: 3.16
Corp. VPN server
Server CPE Intel Core i5-3450S, 8GB RAM, 200GB SSD
Linux Ubuntu 14.04, Kernel version: 3.19
Domestic CPE Netgear R6300v2, CPU Broadcom BCM4708A0,
800MHz (2 cores), 128MB Flash, 256MB RAM
OpenWrt 15.05, Kernel version: 3.18
Business CPE Hawkeye HK-0910, Freescale QorIQ T1040,
1.2GHz (four e5500 cores), 64MB NOR Flash,
2GB RAM DDR3L-1600
Freescale QorIQ SDK V1.7, Kernel version: 3.12
differently (e.g., to launch an attack toward a remote host)
and the current solution is simply to trust the creator of the
application or the entity (e.g., app marketplace owner) that
sells it. Therefore, although we acknowledge that the problem
of determining whether a NF is malicious is emphasized in
case of NNF because of their inferior degree of isolation, we
feel that the problem is rather general and should require a
more generic solution that guarantees, a priori, the goodness
of the VNF, e.g., by means of novel software verification
techniques.
In this respect, a possible direction for future investigation
could consist in integrating remote attestation techniques [8]
in our execution environment, exploiting an external machine
to verify the correctness of the running software.
V. VALIDATION
This section presents the results of a preliminary validation
campaign with a transparent VPN access use case, i.e., when
a user client located on a trusted local network (e.g., home)
needs to connect to its corporate VPN server. In order to
avoid the necessity to install the VPN client software on all
user’s devices (e.g., laptop, smartphone, etc.), the VPN client is
instantiated on the user’s CPE, hence providing secure access
to the corporate network independently of the user device.
The specific testbed, shown in Figure 4, encompasses a
client that generates the traffic, a CPE executing the IPSec
client NF in charge of encrypting/decrypting the traffic, a VPN
server with the opposite duty, and finally a traffic sink. All the
four boxes are connected with point-to-point 1Gbps Ethernet
links; faster speeds are usually not available in low-end CPEs.
Three powerful workstations were used respectively as traffic
source, VPN server and traffic sink in order to avoid those
machines to become the bottleneck, while different flavors of
CPEs are used, namely a mid-range server, a business CPE
based on the Freescale T1040 and a domestic CPE, all with the
same version of the UN software, although compiled for the
specific platform. The specific hardware and software details
are listed in Table III.
The UN was configured through its northbound interface
with a very simple service graph, featuring an IPsec client NF
connected to the LAN and WAN ports; the NF was based
on the well-known Strongswan [9] software, configured to
operate in IPsec tunnel mode (using IKEv2 to establish the
security associations, AES-CBC-128 for the encryption and
SHA1-HMAC for verifying the data integrity).
The use of different hardware platforms was coupled with
different implementations of the same NF, whenever possi-
ble. The server-based CPE was tested with three equivalent
network functions based on VM, Docker and NNF, while the
business CPE and the domestic CPE supported the network
function only as sofware-based NNF. Our experiments took
into consideration (i) the throughput between the two hosts
and the associated CPU load during the experiment, (ii) the
amount of RAM consumed, (iii) the NF image size, (iv) the
amount of additional libraries required to start the requested
execution environment in addition to the base Linux system
(e.g., KVM/QEM for VMs) and (v) the time required to
start the NF. The first two experiments leveraged the iperf
tool installed on the source and sink machines, configured
to generate two unidirectional TCP streams at the maximum
speed. We set the packet size such that the MTU is not
exceeded after the addition of the IPSec header, in order to
avoid fragmentation. All experiments were repeated 10 times
and averaged.
The throughput, in the second column of Table IV, shows
that NNFs and Docker bring significant performance improve-
ments compared to VMs because of the simplified architecture
that does require neither the hypervisor nor the guest OS,
where the NF is running. Their throughput is higher with
a reduced CPU consumption as well. In this respect, NNFs
and Docker show the same level of performance, as expected,
given that they are based on the same technology (i.e., kernel-
based processing in the host plus namespaces).
The memory occupation, i.e., the amount of RAM required
to execute the given NF and the execution platform, showed
in the third column of Table IV, exhibits the same trend.
In this case numbers can only be considered as qualitative
measurements, as they may change considerably by tuning
the NF in a different way, particularly for the VM case. In
our test we created a guest OS with the default installation of
a Ubuntu server 14.04, installing only the packages required
for our VNF to work. As evident, the memory occupation is
definitely higher in the case of VMs, while Docker and NNF
are very similar, although they slightly vary according to the
hardware platform under consideration. Note that Table IV
reports the application-level throughput, i.e., measured on the
source/sink machines. Packets are extended with the additional
Table IV
COMPARING DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTATIONS OF THE IPSEC CLIENT, ON
DIFFERENT MACHINES
IPsec client implementation Thr.@CPU RAM NF image
(Mbps/load%) (MB) (MB)
1) Server CPE - KVM/QEMU 796 / 100% 390.6 522
2) Server CPE - Docker 1095 / 80% 24.2 240
3) Server CPE - NNF 1094 / 80% 19.4 5
4) Domestic CPE - NNF 57.2 / 100% 5 2
5) Business CPE - NNF 617 / 90% 1.9 3.7
IPsec headers required to create the tunnel, hence reaching,
between the CPE and the IPSec server endpoint, an higher
throughput.
The fourth column of Table IV shows the NF image size,
which confirms definitely the advantages of NNFs not only
with respect to VMs, but also against Docker, as the image size
is about two orders of magnitude less than its counterparts2.
Moreover, this impacts also on the time required to download
the NF image from a remote location, which is critical when
the CPE is connected to the Internet through slow links (e.g.,
ADSL). An additional test was carried out in the host environ-
ment to measure the additional disk size, required in the host,
to support the execution of the specific environment; due to the
intrinsic limitations this was only possible on the server-based
CPE. Starting from a clean installation of Ubuntu server 14.04
with default settings, we measured an additional 40MB for
the components (i.e., KVM/QEMU) required to execute VMs
and 30MB required to execute Docker containers. The above
numbers confirm the advantages of the NNF with resource-
constrained environments; in fact, the reason for not testing
Docker on the home and business CPEs is the disk size
limitation on those platforms.
Finally, we measured also the time to start a NF in the
server-based CPE, being the only environment that can start
all the NF types. The result showed about 3 second with VMs
(which require starting the entire VM), 350ms with Docker,
and 727ms with NNF; the baseline, i.e., the time required to
launch the IPsec client on the base system without wrapping
it in any NF, was 154 ms. This confirms, once more, the
advantage of running applications in the host; the (relatively)
high number with NNF is due to some implementation-
dependent delay required to attach the network ports to the
NNF, requires further optimizations.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents the idea of Native Network Functions,
an NFV abstraction that allows to execute network functions
even on resource-constrained devices by exploiting their native
(both software and hardware) capabilities.
Our preliminary validation campaign confirms that NNFs
can be implemented over a reasonable variety of hardware,
2The image size of a NNF is merely the size of the NF software, compiled
for the target platform
ranging from standard high-volume servers to business and
domestic CPEs, with different hardware characteristics (CPU
architecture and speed, memory size, etc.). Furthermore, NNFs
can export existing hardware accelerators as network func-
tions, hence enabling an NFV orchestrator to transparently
take advantage from the superior efficiency of the hardware
compared to pure software implementations.
Future work will aim at extending this approach to sup-
port traditional middleboxes as well (e.g., routers, switches,
etc.), allowing their seamless integration in an existing NFV
infrastructure.
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